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APPROPRIATIONS
N.Y. CoNsT. art. V, § 4:
The legislature may not alter an appropriation bill submitted by
the governor except to strike out or reduce items therein, but it
may add thereto items of appropriation provided that such
additions are stated separately and distinctly from the original
items of the bill and refer each to a single object or purpose.
None of the restrictions of this section, however, shall apply to
appropriations for the legislature or the judiciary.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
Schulz v. Silver1
(decided July 13, 1995)
Plaintiffs claimed that the New York State Constitution2
requires the New York State Legislature to enact the New York
State budget by April 1, 1995 and absent the passage of the
budget or an emergency situation, any expenditures made by the
legislature after April 1, 1995 would be unconstitutional. 3 The
Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed the lower court's
decision rejecting plaintiffs' claim, holding that although the State
Constitution decrees that the legislature review and
approve/disapprove the governor's proposed budget and
expenditures, 4 the New York State Constitution sets forth no
1. 212 A.D.2d 293, 629 N.Y.S.2d 316 (3d Dep't 1995).
2. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 4. This provision provides in pertinent part:
The legislature may not alter an appropriation bill submitted by the
governor except to strike out or reduce items therein, but it may add
thereto items of appropriation provided that such additions are stated
separately and distinctly from the original items of the bill and refer
each to a single object or purpose. None of the restrictions of this
section, however, shall apply to appropriations for the legislature or
judiciary.
Id.
3. Schulz, 212 A.D.2d at 295-96, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
4. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 4. See supra note 2.
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specific time frame within which to perform that task. 5 Further,
the court held that the role of a New York State Assembly
member in the budget process did not constitute a ministerial
activity. 6
Plaintiffs commenced this suit in response to the legislature's
failure to adopt a budget on or before the commencement of the
state's fiscal year. 7 Anticipating another failure, plaintiffs
brought this action to direct the members of the New York State
Assembly and Senate to act upon "one full set of budget
appropriation bills submitted by respondent Governor" 8 and to
declare that, absent passage of bills and "an emergency situation
in the State, all expenditures of state funds subsequent to April 1,
1995 are unconstitutional." 9
Defendant moved to dismiss "on the grounds that the case
[was] non-justiciable, that the petitioner lack[ed] standing, and
that the complaint fail[ed] to state a cause of action .... " 10 The
trial court granted the motion to dismiss and plaintiffs
appealed. 11
Considering the claim, the appellate division first addressed the
issue of justiciability. The court determined that the critical
question was whether the New York State Constitution sets forth
a specific standard that the legislature must comply with or
whether the matter should be left to the discretion of the
legislature. 12 The court stated that when the New York State
5. Schulz, 212 A.D.2d at 296, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 318 (stating that "while
the framers of the [New York State] Constitution have mandated that the
Legislature review the proposed budget and approve or disapprove the various
expenditures proposed by the Governor, they have established no specific time
frame in which to accomplish that task").
6. Id.
7. Id. at 294, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 295, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 317-18.
11. Id. at 295, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
12. Id. The court stated:
A justiciable controversy is one solvable by a court rather than some
other forum and ... it has to do with whether a matter is resolvable by
the judicial branch of government by way of interpreting or enforcing a
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Constitution sets forth a standard, the judiciary may compel
compliance. 13
In King v. Cuomo,14 the court held that the judicial branch may
review the constitutionality of the bicameral "recall" practice
because the New York State Constitution sets forth how a bill
becomes law. 15 Thus, when the courts are ruling to enforce a
clear and unambiguous constitutional requirement, there is no
trespass upon the legislature's authority and separation of powers
is preserved. 16 Further, the court stated that "[o]ur precedents
are firm that the 'courts will always be available to resolve
disputes concerning the scope of that authority which is granted
by the Constitution to the other two branches of the
government. '" 17
Similarly, in Jiggetts v. Grinker,18 judicial review was held
constitutional where a statute, rather than the constitution, set
forth a clear and unambiguous standard. 19 The court reasoned
that the statute's requirements call for a finding of justiciability
because "the courts may compel obedience to a statutory
demand."20
In contrast, the Schulz court held the issue to be non-justiciable
because the Constitution does not set forth a specific time frame
within which the legislature must perform its task and, therefore,
it is "not the subject of judicial review."21 The court relied on
statutory mandate or by the executive and/or legislative branches in the
exercise of their purely political function.
Id.
13. Id.
14. 81 N.Y.2d 247, 613 N.E.2d 950, 597 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1993).
15. Id. at 251, 613 N.E.2d at 951-52, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
16. Id.
17. Id. (quoting Saxton v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 545, 551, 378 N.E.2d 95,
99, 406 N.Y.S.2d 732, 735 (1978)).
18. 75 N.Y.2d 411, 553 N.E.2d 570, 554 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1990).
19. Id. at 415, 553 N.E.2d at 572, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 94 (stating that "the
statute is not simply a guide for the Commissioner when exercising his
discretion on the subject but establishes a standard of care which executive
officers must meet unless or until the Legislature changes it").
20. Id.
21. Schulz, 212 A.D.2d at 296, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
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Saxton v. Carey,22 where Governor Carey had allegedly failed to
submit a proper budget.23 The court refused to find justiciability
because a necessary element of judicial review was missing,
namely, budget itemization. 24 However, the court did reserve the
power of judicial review for other budget cases by stating "[w]e
do not suggest ... that the budgetary process is per se always
beyond the realm of judicial consideration." 25 Thus, once the
governor submits a budget to the legislature, the extent to which
the latter may act upon another bill before acting upon the first
bill is an issue certainly within the scope of judicial authority. 26
Further, the Schulz court reasoned that the legislature's
responsibility requires "the exercise of considerable judgment
and discretion."' 27 In Klostermann v. Cuomo,28 the court stated
that "[tihe long-established law is that 'while a mandamus is an
appropriate remedy to enforce the performance of a ministerial
duty, it is well settled that it will not be awarded to compel an act
in respect to which the officer may exercise judgment or
discretion.' "29
In addition, the court noted that a citizen taxpayer had standing
to assert this claim. The court stated that "State Finance Law
section 123(b)(1) confers standing upon any citizen taxpayer to
maintain an action against a State officer who 'has caused, is now
causing, or is about to cause a wrongful expenditure,
misappropriation, misapplication, or any other illegal or
unconstitutional disbursement of state funds.' 30
Although the court conferred standing and reserved the power
of judicial review, it held that the legislature may approve an
22. 44 N.Y.2d 545, 378 N.E.2d 95, 406 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1978).
23. Id. at 548, 378 N.E.2d at 97, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
24. Id. at 549, 378 N.E.2d at 97, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
25. Id. at 551, 378 N.E.2d at 99, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
26. Id.
27. Schulz, 212 A.D.2d at 296, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
28. 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984).
29. Id. at 539, 463 N.E.2d at 595, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 254 (quoting
Gimprich v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 401, 406, 118 N.E.2d 578, 580
(1954)).
30. Schulz, 212 A.D.2d at 296, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
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appropriation bill after commencement of the fiscal year in the
absence of an emergency. 31 The court reasoned that the New
York State Constitution establishes, through the 1938
amendments, that there is no need for an emergency for the
legislature to adopt an interim appropriation bill, and, therefore,
the plaintiff's claim was not supported by a fair interpretation of
the New York State Constitution.32
31. Id. at 297, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
32. Id.
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